- 2000 NOV 12 -


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00-11-12          0700    Weekend morning routine.  Worked on notes first thing and copied off the following memo that was provided to Cst. COOPER for forwarding to Insp. LATHEM in a cover memo expressing his, Cst. KERRs and my thoughts on the closure of the hangar and the request of Vic GERDEN for follow-on time.

             Sgt. T.C. JUBY provided the following correspondence to Cst. COOPER on 00-11-12 for inclusion in a memo to the OIC MCU as requested on 00-11-08.

            In response to our conversation (LATHEM/JUBY - 00-11-08), the following are concerns that I have regarding the closure of activities at the Shearwater A hangar.

            1-         Assistance to the TSB in generating notes and reports.  Follow-up cooperation between John GARSTANG and myself regarding notes and reports, as indicated in the memo from Vic GERDEN dated 00-10-31, is fully expected and indeed should be encouraged so there is a continuous exchange of information as conforms to the TSB/RCMP partnership until such time as this file is finally concluded.

            2-         Continued involvement in tests and important file activities.  Further materials analysis will be conducted in this file as numerous exhibits remain at or go to test centres.  The British software program will be utilized to explore various fire scenarios.  These activities are of the utmost importance, as is our attendance and/or direct knowledge of the results.  In addition, this software program, not previously utilized in this country, has possible applications in everyday arson investigations that should be further explored.  Further AES examinations are required in an effort to determine the reason for the magnesium, the source of which remains elusive and is key to my concerns, and my information is that it remains a concern for Dr. BROWN.  Until that source and a definite accidental cause of the fire are determined, we must maintain an active presence in the file.  The AES report is due shortly and as we have played a significant role in the process to date, we should attend any upcoming meetings planned to discuss the outcome of these tests.  Of added interest is the recent identification of an extremely hot burn area on the ceiling tile above one of the forward doors.  The combination of these unknowns in the aircraft debris requires that we remain vigilant in this investigation until these matters can be fully explained.

            3-         Continued security of the crash debris.  The TSB are completing plans to secure the frame inside the hangar, possibly in room #111.  Other materials will be secured in the J hangar complex.  TSB shares our concern for the continued security of these materials, which is of importance until such time as a final decision is made regarding the cause of this crash.  While plans are being made to keep the materials secure in compounds, a simple protocol should be developed to maintain a record of all persons who enter the secured areas.  This should include a limitation of access to the material, ensuring that an authorized TSB member is present during those times of access, with the particulars of the visit being recorded.  In addition, the alarm codes and keys to the J Hangar locks should be changed to ensure only authorized TSB personnel have access.  Until such time as the file is concluded, we still have an interest in the continuity of the exhibits.

            4-         A summation report of Ident functions and findings will be submitted to the file, as would be expected in any major file where any extensive Ident work has been performed.  This will act as a summary of notes and reports for any file audit or subsequent disclosure.

            5-         This member plans to submit a report of this files Ident function to Ident Services, Ottawa, with copies directed to the Division level to ensure that procedures and activities such as AES, virtual reality photography, etc. are fully documented for future use in every day as well as extraordinary files.

            In short, it is recommended that this member remain in close contact with the TSB members to access any of the tests, reports and other sundry activities that will have an effect on the final outcome of this file.  This member is the logical selection for this action, being involved throughout the file with the key TSB personnel and knowledgeable of the tests being performed.  To assign the responsibility of this task to another person in Major Crime would break continuity of the processes previously undertaken in this file.  In addition, as i/c of Halifax FIS and the main investigating Ident member, I maintain a responsibility to complete the unfinished Ident function for this file. 

            This member plans to take LTO and AOL periods until late spring (details of which will be submitted by separate memo to both the OIC MCU and the OIC Contract Policing).  During that period, any requests for my assistance from the TSB will be handled directly with them, with any transportation to Ottawa for such purposes to be supplied by the TSB, with the OIC MCU being advised of the actions being taken.  Any normal day periods incurred by these activities will be taken as regular working hours, with the LTO period adjusted by the amount of time worked.  It is expected that any overtime periods will be at the expense of the TSB, and all expenses for these activities will be forwarded to the TSB.  With this in mind, consideration should be given to leaving me on the H0002 collator code for the remainder of the budgeted fiscal year.

            The further notes and reports generated by these actions will be written during the period and submitted to the file as and when completed.

 (T.C. Juby), Sgt.     Forensic Ident Section     Swissair Task Force



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