00-11-12
0700 Weekend
morning routine. Worked on
notes first thing and copied off the
following memo that was provided to
Cst. COOPER for forwarding to Insp.
LATHEM in a cover memo expressing
his, Cst. KERR’s and my thoughts on
the closure of the hangar and the
request of Vic GERDEN for follow-on
time.
Sgt. T.C. JUBY provided the
following correspondence to Cst.
COOPER on 00-11-12 for inclusion in
a memo to the OIC MCU as requested
on 00-11-08.
In response to our conversation
(LATHEM/JUBY - 00-11-08), the
following are concerns that I have
regarding the closure of activities
at the Shearwater ‘A’ hangar.
1-
Assistance to the TSB in generating
notes and reports. Follow-up
cooperation between John GARSTANG
and myself regarding notes and
reports, as indicated in the memo
from Vic GERDEN dated 00-10-31, is
fully expected and indeed should be
encouraged so there is a continuous
exchange of information as conforms
to the TSB/RCMP partnership until
such time as this file is finally
concluded.
2-
Continued involvement in tests and
important file activities.
Further materials analysis will be
conducted in this file as numerous
exhibits remain at or go to test
centres. The British software
program will be utilized to explore
various fire scenarios. These
activities are of the utmost
importance, as is our attendance
and/or direct knowledge of the
results. In addition, this
software program, not previously
utilized in this country, has
possible applications in everyday
arson investigations that should be
further explored. Further AES
examinations are required in an
effort to determine the reason for
the magnesium, the source of which
remains elusive and is key to my
concerns, and my information is that
it remains a concern for Dr. BROWN.
Until that source and a definite
accidental cause of the fire are
determined, we must maintain an
active presence in the file.
The AES report is due shortly and as
we have played a significant role in
the process to date, we should
attend any upcoming meetings planned
to discuss the outcome of these
tests. Of added interest is
the recent identification of an
extremely hot burn area on the
ceiling tile above one of the
forward doors. The combination
of these unknowns in the aircraft
debris requires that we remain
vigilant in this investigation until
these matters can be fully
explained.
3-
Continued security of the crash
debris. The TSB are completing
plans to secure the frame inside the
hangar, possibly in room #111.
Other materials will be secured in
the ‘J’ hangar complex. TSB
shares our concern for the continued
security of these materials, which
is of importance until such time as
a final decision is made regarding
the cause of this crash. While
plans are being made to keep the
materials secure in compounds, a
simple protocol should be developed
to maintain a record of all persons
who enter the secured areas.
This should include a limitation of
access to the material, ensuring
that an authorized TSB member is
present during those times of
access, with the particulars of the
visit being recorded. In
addition, the alarm codes and keys
to the ‘J’ Hangar locks should be
changed to ensure only authorized
TSB personnel have access.
Until such time as the file is
concluded, we still have an interest
in the continuity of the exhibits.
4-
A summation report of Ident
functions and findings will be
submitted to the file, as would be
expected in any major file where any
extensive Ident work has been
performed. This will act as a
summary of notes and reports for any
file audit or subsequent disclosure.
5-
This member plans to submit a report
of this file’s Ident function to
Ident Services, Ottawa, with copies
directed to the Division level to
ensure that procedures and
activities such as AES, virtual
reality photography, etc. are fully
documented for future use in every
day as well as extraordinary files.
In short, it is recommended that
this member remain in close contact
with the TSB members to access any
of the tests, reports and other
sundry activities that will have an
effect on the final outcome of this
file. This member is the
logical selection for this action,
being involved throughout the file
with the key TSB personnel and
knowledgeable of the tests being
performed. To assign the
responsibility of this task to
another person in Major Crime would
break continuity of the processes
previously undertaken in this file.
In addition, as i/c of Halifax FIS
and the main investigating Ident
member, I maintain a responsibility
to complete the unfinished Ident
function for this file.
This member plans to take LTO and
AOL periods until late spring
(details of which will be submitted
by separate memo to both the OIC MCU
and the OIC Contract Policing).
During that period, any requests for
my assistance from the TSB will be
handled directly with them, with any
transportation to Ottawa for such
purposes to be supplied by the TSB,
with the OIC MCU being advised of
the actions being taken. Any
normal day periods incurred by these
activities will be taken as regular
working hours, with the LTO period
adjusted by the amount of time
worked. It is expected that
any overtime periods will be at the
expense of the TSB, and all expenses
for these activities will be
forwarded to the TSB. With
this in mind, consideration should
be given to leaving me on the H0002
collator code for the remainder of
the budgeted fiscal year.
The further notes and reports
generated by these actions will be
written during the period and
submitted to the file as and when
completed.
(T.C. Juby), Sgt.
Forensic Ident Section
Swissair Task Force