TWICE AS FAR
SWISSAIR 111
CRASH INVESTIGATION
- EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE -
MAKE IT SO
CONNECTIONS AND MEETINGS
The following two photos
show some of the connections and meetings
that took place
during the early stages of the file investigation.
This photo shows Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and his wife upon arrival in Halifax soon after the crash. He likely had meetings with officials of the Province, as well as attending functions involving the family members. The important point is that he had an involvement in the file. To what extent we likely will never know.
This photo shows Mr. Bouchard, the TSB's Chairman, second from the right. The Commanding Officer of 'H' Division, RCMP Assistant Commissioner D. Bishop, is beside him, second from the left and gesturing with his hands. Vic Gerden is to the right of the photo looking somewhat distracted. The setting for this meeting is early in the investigation.
On the 23rd of April, 1999, the Federal Solicitor General, Lawrence MacAulay, was conducted through the hangar along with some senior officers from the Force. He was the Government Minister responsible for the RCMP at that time, so he obviously had an interest in how the file was being conducted. Manny, the TSB photographer, took this photo while the panorama and object model photographic process was being explained to him. With a telephoto lens, he has framed the photo as though the Sol Gen is about to be strangled. Nevertheless, he survived the explanation and acted as if he understood the procedure and its value. Some of the high priced entourage in the background included Lee Fraser, who can be seen between the Sol Gen and me, and Assistant Commissioner L'Abbe, who was the Director of the Force’s Information and Identification Services. He is on the Solicitor General's right. Lee as the Director of the RCMP's Forensic Identification Services was subordinate to L'Abbe. Cpl. Chris Harmes, who did a great job in the hangar until June 2000, is to the right of the photo behind my camera and tripod, and the other officers beyond remain unknown to me.
RCMP Commissioner Murray's second trip to Shearwater to view the debris occurred on the 13th of May, 1999. During this trip, his shadow was able to rest as Murray didn't rush through the hangar as he had done in September of 1998, much to the embarrassment of those RCMP members who caught only a fleeting glimpse of his shadow running to keep up with him. The Commanding Officer of 'H' Div., Assistant Commissioner Dwight Bishop is on the right end with Andy Lathem in his standard 'Men in Black' business suit beside him. On Lathem's right is Commissioner Murray. Andy's dark glasses and his 'wand thing-a-ma-jiggy' are likely back in his office. Vic Gerden, Lead Investigator for the TSB, is at the Commissioner's right shoulder in the blue TSB pullover shirt. Larry Vance is on the extreme left with Chris Harmes on his left shoulder at the back. Of course, this photo opportunity was carried out in front of the reconstruction jig in the hangar at the Shearwater base. Dr. Brown's initial AES findings are still four months away, and there is no indication yet of anything amiss with the file other than the extreme amount of burning and extensive molten aluminium.
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MEDIA RELEASE OF SWISSAIR INVESTIGATION
MEDIA RELEASE OF SWISS INVESTIGATION
The following was located on the internet
and purported as
comments made by Sgt. Bill Price of the RCMP Halifax Media Relations.
Following that are
portions of a speech made by Mr. Benoit Bouchard,
Chairman of the TSB
at an NTSB and TSB Symposium
in 1999
Perhaps it's my background as a police officer,
but I cannot help but think that the attitudes of the TSB
expressed here by its Chairman
are more than a little naive.
Those attitudes were reflected in how they performed this investigation.
Companies who originally manufactured vital pieces of equipment
were asked to perform examinations of that equipment
after its retrieval from the debris
to determine if it had been faulty.
Yet Mr. Bouchard felt that
if any of those companies had found a fault in their piece of equipment
they would not have hesitated to come forward and lay claim to it being faulty
and thereby possibly incur the expense of civil actions against themselves.
The TSB's methods for crash examinations are faulty to the extreme.
They ask the foxes to inspect all aspects of the hen house.
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FILE NOTES OF MEETINGS & DISCUSSIONS
FILE NOTES OF
MEETINGS & DISCUSSIONS
The following links
provide my actual file notes
that were written
after each major meeting or discussion
that I attended between the RCMP and the
TSB,
or with my RCMP management
Each dealt with some important aspect of
the investigation.
They all provide an insight into how
events progressed,
and how the actual criminal investigation
was curtailed by the management of
both the TSB and the RCMP.
These dates not only indicate the day of
the meeting,
but the day on which those notes were
made.
In every instance
the notes were made
as soon as possible after the meeting.
For some of the notes,
names have been removed
as they had no direct involvement in the
matter described.
LATHEM'S FOLLY & RECKLESS MEETING
1999 OCT 12
-- NOTES FOR 99 OCT 12 -- |
This is the first meeting two weeks after learning of the initial AES results.
Supt. Duncan had already advised me
that I must be involved in all testing until this matter can be resolved.
But Lathem's approach was that there woulf be no change in the investigation
and he questioned the integrity of the testing process and results.
NOT BEING OBJECTIVE
1999 NOV 16
-- NOTES FOR 99 NOV 16 -- |
A conversation with a TSB member and then
discussions with GORMAN
AES MEETING WITH GERDEN
1999 NOV 30
-- NOTES FOR 99 NOV 30 -- |
The TSB was seriously questioning whether or not to continue with the AES testing.
My attitude was that once started, we had to follow the evidence trail to the end.
Gerden's approach was much different.
AES MEETING WITH TSB
1999 DEC 15
-- NOTES FOR 99 DEC 15 -- |
Meeting to discuss AES test equipment,
and additional testing methods.
MEETING WITH GORMAN
-- NOTES FOR 00 FEB 08 -- |
Gorman meets to discuss my loss of objectivity.
AES MEETING WITH TSB
2000 FEB 09
-- NOTES FOR 00 FEB 09 -- |
This is the meeting where future AES testing is discussed,
and Jim Foot states that he is going to put Dr. Brown back on track.
MEETING WITH LATHEM & GORMAN
2000 FEB 17
-- NOTES FOR 00 FEB 17 -- |
This meeting starts out as Gorman's exhibit control problem,
but spreads into many other areas when Lathem joins in.
It includes my email that warned Dr. Brown about Foot's threat.
MEETING WITH LATHEM & GERDEN
2000 MAR 24
-- NOTES FOR 00 MAR 24 -- |
This meeting is where we were notified
that the TSB will no longer pay for the back room investigators,
so they must leave the file.
SPOOLING DOWN MEETING WITH LATHEM
2000 APR 11
-- NOTES FOR 00 APR 11 -- |
Discussions between Lathem and file investigators
about the 'spooling down' of the file for the RCMP.
PARKING THE FILE
00 MAY 03
-- NOTES FOR 00 MAY 03 -- |
This meeting was with Superintendent Steve Duncan and Inspector Atkins
during which some questionable reasons are provided
for the closing of the RCMP's file.
MEETING WITH LATHEM & GORMAN
00 MAY 12
-- NOTES FOR 00 MAY 12 -- |
This meeting is where Lathem & Gorman express their fake concern over my stress levels,
and I am subtly threatened about my approach to the file.
MEETING WITH LATHEM & THEN GORMAN
00 MAY 15
-- NOTES FOR 00 MAY 15 -- |
Another meeting with Lathem about the closing of the file.
Then Gorman shows up and seems to nearly apologize for his actions.
AES MEETING WITH TSB
2000 MAY 16
-- NOTES FOR 00 MAY 16 -- |
Foot describes the bead cutting process and lies about it.
Discussions about other exhibit testing,
and the FBI's previous use of AES
GERDEN'S 56 MILLION DOLLAR MEETING
2000 MAY 25
-- NOTES FOR 00 MAY 25 -- |
This link is actually for two TSB meetings.
One discloses the further attempts to discredit the AES testing results.
The second reveals the TSB's desire to close down the file
before all their investigation is complete.
PARKING THE FILE
00 JUN 29
-- NOTES FOR 00 JUN 29 -- |
This meeting is the last group investigators' meeting in the hangar,
for what little all but two of them were worth.
GORMAN'S AUDIT, ARGUMENT & REPRIMAND
00 JUL 14
-- NOTES FOR 00 JUL 14 & 00 JUL 17 -- |
This describes Gorman's audit of the hangar Ident Section,
and his removal of required equipment.
Then there is his delivery of the the reprimand.
DR BROWN'S EMAIL & DISCUSSION WITH LATHEM
2000 NOV 06
-- NOTES FOR 00 NOV 06 -- |
This link is the meeting with Lathem
just before his trip to Ottawa to advise the Commissioner on the file's status,
and three weeks before the 'Ambush Meetings'.
LATHEM'S AMBUSH MEETINGS
2000 DEC 01
-- NOTES FOR 00 DEC 01 -- |
This meeting is where Lathem, Gerden, and Fraser
severely reprimand and humiliate me,
and I end up walking out of the second meeting.
LATHEM'S REPRIMAND & DISCUSSION
2000 DEC 19
-- NOTES FOR 00 DEC 19 -- |
Lathem provides his written reprimand,
and more issues are discussed.
'CHANGE THE NOTES' MEETING
2001 FEB 20
-- NOTES FOR 01 FEB 20 -- |
This link is for the meeting where they should have been arrested
and charged with obstruction of justice.
DISCUSSION WITH FRASER IN FREDERICTON
01 JUN 19
-- NOTES FOR 01 JUN 19-- |
Fraser tries to say the meeting was a training exercise,
and he informs me of the turnover of the AES reports.
THE TANNER MEETINGS
2001 NOV 21
-- NOTES FOR 01 NOV 21 -- |
These are the notes for one of the meetings with Tanner.
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PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFICIAL TURNOVER
PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFICIAL TURNOVER
TO THE RCMP
OF
THE AES REPORTS
BY THE TSB
GERDEN/FRASER PHONE CONVERSATION
2001 MAR 20
FRASER'S NOTES
The following are notes written by Superintendent Lee Fraser
as the Director of the RCMP's Forensic Identification Services.
They are of a phone conversation that he had on 2001 MAR 20
with Vic Gerden as the Lead Investigator
for the Swissair investigation
Note that Fraser uses the term
'regarding a report'
indicating a single
report.
When read in context with the line
'not changed appreciably since last info
but it is not going away',
one can only conclude that he knows of
Dr. Brown's first AES report,
and here he is speaking of the second AES
report.
Lee Fraser had never been involved in the
aircraft reconstruction.
Once the morgue was finished in early
November, 1998,
he spent considerable time travelling to
give his morgue presentations to other agencies.
However, he was not involved in the reconstruction sid
For certain though,
he had been quickly briefed by Lathem
before the reading of the notes
and the subsequent 'Change the Notes'
meeting.
Likely it was during the phone
conversation they had
when they set up the reading of the notes
and the change-the-notes meeting.
However, he would not have been privy to the
AES process and all its fine details.
He likely had been present for the
Commissioner's meeting on the 15th of November, 2000
when the future of the file was discussed.
So he knew what the intended direction
was for the file.
Upon receiving this phone call,
he immediately would have contacted
someone in the Commissioner's office
along with Lathem in Halifax.
He would then have received his
directions from the Commissioner's office.
Also remember that he was
fully aware of Access to Information
and what should and should not appear on
paper.
Any notes of those internal phone calls
would have been destroyed.
After all, he was using a note pad with
tear-off sheets of paper.
The writing gives the appearance of a
re-write
of notes previously made.
So the obvious question is,
why did he become involved in the
'investigation'
when everything should have been handled
by Halifax?
As the RCMP's lead physical evidence
investigator,
shouldn't I have been involved in the
matter?
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GORMAN'S MEETING ARRANGEMENTS
So now for the meeting and the official turnover of the reports.
However,
they already knew what was in the reports.
They had known five months earlier,
back on the 1st of December, 2000.
At that time, the reports were not to be physically turned over to the RCMP.
It would seem that Garstang upset those plans by forcing the issue with Gerden.
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DR. BROWN'S
SECOND AES REPORT
TO THE TSB
It was not until after the airing of the CBC program
that I learned of the contents of Dr. Brown's reports.
The second report is lengthy,
too long to put on this page.
So a link is provided.
-- DR BROWN'S SECOND AES REPORT -- |
Again, without having to look for them, here are his conclusions.
While the conclusions are considerably toned down,
there is still a problem with unresolved magnesium and aluminum.
It was my experience when dealing with the FAA burn unit
and others knowledgeable of fire cause determination,
that the mere mention of high magnesium led to a comment about an incendiary device.
Perhaps others without the knowledge
should have listened and heeded the warnings.
The fact remains that
Dr. Brown was pressured to supply this second report in a prescribed manner.
It disturbed him enough
to cause him to send off an email to me describing that pressure.
The second report did not reflect his true opinion of the facts,
an opinion that he was highly qualified to provide.
An opinion that only a few others who are similarly qualified could verify or dispute.
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HTAA
& THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
ALUMINUM, MAGNESIUM & IRON
ALUMINUM
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thermite
In the following example, elemental aluminum reduces the oxide of iron.
The materials are commonly powdered and mixed with a binder to keep them
together. Fe2O3 + 2 Al → 2 Fe + Al2O3 The products are aluminum oxide, iron, and a large amount of heat.
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MAGNESIUM
http://www.lenntech.com/periodic/elements/mg.htm Magnesium is very chemically active. It takes the place of hydrogen in boiling water. A great number of metals can be produced by thermic reduction of its salts and oxidized forms with magnesium. It joins together with most non-metals and almost every acid. Chemical dangers: The substance may spontaneously ignite on contact with air or moisture producing irritating or toxic fumes. It reacts violently with strong oxidants and many other substances to cause a fire and explosion hazard. It reacts with acids and water forming flammable hydrogen gas causing fire and explosion hazard.
This is an exothermic reaction
in which there is a net release of energy as heat.
2Mg +
O2 →2MgO + energy
Magnesium is also capable of
reducing water to the highly-flammable hydrogen gas, which will be
ignited by the excess heat given by the reduction reaction.
Mg +2H2O
→
Mg(OH)2 + H2 Magnesium also reacts with carbon dioxide to form magnesium oxide and carbon.
Mg +CO2 → 2MgO + C
Carbon dioxide fire
extinguishers cannot be used for extinguishing magnesium fires.
Burning magnesium is usually quenched by using a Class D dry chemical
fire extinguisher, or by smothering with a non-flammable material.
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HTAA - HIGH TEMPERATURE ACCELERANT ARSON
This site contains an article written by
Steven W. Carman,
Special Agent
May 1994
While lengthy at 155 double-spaced pages, it covers what was known of HTAA at that
time. |
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